University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 10
Issue 2 Winter 1981

Article 8

1981

Book Reviews: Tort Law in America: An
Intellectual History
Alan Betten
Sagal, Filbert, Quasney & Betten, P.A.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Betten, Alan (1981) "Book Reviews: Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 10: Iss. 2,
Article 8.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol10/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS
TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY.

By G. Ed-

ward White.* Oxford University Press, New York, New York.
1980. Pp. 283. Reviewed by Alan Betten.t
In his book Tort Law in America: An IntellectualHistory,I G.
Edward White attempts to demonstrate that the succession of
doctrinal perspectives concerning tort law from 1870 to the present may best be understood "as deriving from the shifting ideas of
legal scholars and judges."2 Combining perspectives generally
used by intellectual historians, sociologists of knowledge, and
legal historians, White sets forth the thesis that "the ideas of certain elite groups within the legal profession have had an influence
disproportionate to the numbers of persons advancing these
ideas."'
Generally well written 4 and entertaining, White's book is, unfortunately, disappointing, especially to those who have read his
earlier books concerning American legal thought., Overshadowing
the fact that some of the material contained in Tort Law in
America has been published in these earlier works, and that the
new version suffers when compared with the earlier versions,
White's intellectual prosopography emphasizes the autonomous
nature of law, the notion that law responds to the rational arguments and theories of treatise-writers and appellate judges, and it
undervalues materialist causes underlying the development of
tort law that are derived from the surrounding economic and
social milieu. Although White correctly recognizes the importance
of the legal intelligentsia in tracing their history, he fails either to
account satisfactorily for other potentially important factors in
tort law's development or to note that the intellectual tradition
cannot be "organized" as neatly as he might desire.
The basic structure of Tort Law in America is dictated by
White's perception of four major periods in the development of
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1. The book is hereinafter referred to as Tort Law in America.
2.

TORT LAW IN AMERICA

at xi.

3. Id at xii.
4. The serious student of legal history will no doubt be somewhat hampered in his enjoyment of the book by the placement of the notes at the end of the text. At the least,
substantive notes, in contrast to bibliographical notes, should be placed at the bottom of the page.
5. See G. EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (1978); G. EDWARD
WHITE,

JUDGES

THE

AMERICAN

JUDICIAL TRADITION:
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tort law: Langdellianism (Conceptualism), 1870-1910; Legal
Realism, 1910-1945; Consensus Legal Thought, 1945-1970; and
Neoconceptualism, 1970 to the present. Although the discussion
of each intellectual period focuses on the theories and writings of
celebrated legal scholars, White also devotes entire chapters to
Judge Cardozo and Judge Traynor, who represent the Realist and
Consensus Legal Thought schools, respectively.
White states at the outset of his book that the "emergence of
Torts as a distinct branch of the law owed as much to changes in
jurisprudential thought as to the spread of industrialization."' ,
Nevertheless, much of White's discussion concerning the emergence of torts and its first developmental phase, Langdellianism,
focuses on the rise of conceptualism. According to White, the
post-Civil War "Victorian" intellectuals attempted to regain a
sense of order and unity that they believed had existed in eighteenth-century America. Because society was becoming increasingly atomized and secularized, however, the traditional modes of
social ordering - the family unit and organized religion - were
unavailable as theoretical bases. The intellectuals of this period
thus sought refuge in the emerging concept of the scientific ordering of knowledge. 7 Reliance on the scientific method was accompanied by the collapse of the common law writ system, which had
previously served as the surrogate for doctrinal classification. As
balkanization of the special pleading rules occurred and laxity in
the enforcement of the technicalities of pleading increased, the
value of the writ system declined commensurately!8
With the growth of scientific, universalistic thought, it was
only a matter of time before the writ system became obsolete.
Such was the feat of Holmes in his lectures The Common Law, 9 in
which he asserted that there was a distinct branch of law known
as torts and that it could be subdivided into three categories: absolute liability, intentional torts, and, most important, negligence.
Although not in agreement with Holmes' contention that liability
in tort had always been based on a determination of fault, White
states that court decisions prior to 1870 illustrate the evolution of
the negligence theory, from an omission of a preexisting, specific
duty owed to a limited class of persons to a violation of a
generalized standard of care owed to all persons. 10 White notes
that this change in the perception of the nature of negligence was,
to some extent, due to the increased number of "stranger" cases

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

TORT LAW IN AMERICA at 3.

Id at 6.
Id at 7-9.
O.W. HOLMES,

JR., THE COMMON LAW

TORT LAW IN AMERICA

at 18.

(M. Howe ed. 1963).
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between persons with no preexisting relationship to each other.11
Concomitant with the advent of monistic theories of torts,
such as Holmes', was the use of the scientific method of studying
law, initiated at Harvard Law School by Christopher Columbus
Langdell. One learned law by means of a scientific method and, if
presented with a group of cases, one could extract the "correct"
principle of law. 2 Tension was inherent in this method of study,
however, because the common law method of the growth of legal
doctrine conflicted with the idea of the existence of universalistic
principles. Thus, tort theorists were forced to recognize that
judges and juries might not act in accordance with their scientifically-derived principles, and therefore their rules and theories
might be disregarded. 3
According to White, the Legal Realist movement began to
emerge by the end of the first decade of this century. These Realists, within whose jurisprudential school White also places Social
Jurisprudence, exhibited attitudes common to early twentiethcentury reformist thought: an emphasis on relevancy, objectivity,
empirical research, and antiuniversalism. 4 Unlike Langdellianism, Legal Realism emulated the social sciences rather than the
natural sciences. In its ideological purity, Legal Realism was without any particular set of predetermined values. Although Social
Jurisprudes such as Pound disagreed primarily with Langdellianism's lack of social goals, Realists denied that the "law" could be
clearly delineated or that a set of values could be consistently advanced by the courts. For the Realists, doctrine was continually in
a hypothetical state. 15
White focuses much deserved attention on Leon Green's
"pure Realism," which tended to resurrect the discrete tort actions of the pre-Langdellian era by means of a functional approach.16 Yet he clearly perceives Cardozo as more representative
of mainstream Realist thought. Cardozo knew that a judge needed
to be creative in order to derive enduring principles. 7 He also
knew, however, that the method of derivation could not reject the
traditional values of "uniformity, predictability, and orderliness
in common law subjects.""' His genius as a judicial theorist
stemmed from his ability to fuse these goals of the Conceptualists
with Realist notions of relevance and reform by substituting, for
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example, judge-controlled standards of "reasonable foreseeability" and "ambit of risk" for ambiguous standards of "proximate
cause."19

Although the methodology of "pure" Legal Realism overly
denigrated the idea of law as doctrine, after World War II many
Realists came to believe that promoting rational decision-making
processes could insure proper value choices. Properly made, law
had an "inner morality" that insured its liberal beneficence. The
most important value of this Consensus Legal Thought 20 was that
tort law, rather than being utilized to admonish blameworthy persons, would be utilized to compensate injured persons. During
this period, White asserts, tort law shifted from the realm of private law to public law.21 Just as Cardozo was forced to fuse Conceptualist and Realist ideals, torts scholars now were forced to
find a doctrinal approach on which to base their new social justice
policy. This doctrinal gap was admirably bridged by treatiser
William Prosser. In addition to retaining the interest-balance approach of the Realists, Prosser's summaries of the "state of the
law" in a given area of torts became the doctrinal bases for the
new jurisprudence. Prosser's consensus approach emphasized
that tort law could be subjected to doctrinal analysis and that
such doctrine changed constantly, but only incrementally.22
For Judge Traynor, White's classic Consensus Legal Thought
judge, objectivity and rational decision making could be achieved
by the neutral, disinterested judge's enlightened use of the thenpersuasive intellectual views. If such enlightened rational decision
making led to activist policy decisions, then Traynor was fully
prepared to be an activist.23 Yet, even if, as White asserts, Traynor

legitimated the commonly accepted policy-making role of judges
in tort cases, he was bound to his intellectual milieu by his belief in
the efficacy of a rational decision-making process. 24 Such belief
clearly disturbs White, for "there is nothing about the people
selected to be judges or the process of judging itself that suggests
that the judiciary has a greater hold on 'rationality' than the
' 25
rest of us.
...

White is far more disturbed, however, by the resurgence of
conceptualist theorizing in the 1970's. He notes that much of this
Neoconceptualism is put forth at a time when alternatives to tort

19. Id. at 125.
20. In an earlier work, White labeled this school of thought Process Jurisprudence. See
THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 5, at 252.
21. TORT LAW IN AMERICA at 146-53.
22. Id. at 153-63.
23. Id. at 188.
24. Id. at 208-09.
25. Id at 209.
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law, such as no-fault insurance, are being increasingly devised.
White dismisses both the economics-based theories of Posner and
Calabresi, because they make incorrect assumptions concerning
human nature and action, and the corrective justice theories of
Fletcher and Epstein, because they would retain elements of interest balancing
akin to the problems now found in negligence
6
theory.
In contrast, White views torts as "a complex of diverse
' 27
wrongs whose policy implications point in different directions.
Recognizing that tort law is, in part, a form of public law, he would
retain elements from both the admonitory and compensatory
functions of torts. White's major concern is not that a unitary
standard of tort liability may be implemented but rather that
those lawmakers who are in some measure accountable to the populace - judges and legislators - may permit unaccountable academics to expand unjustifiably their influence over the lawmaking
process.
As outlined above, White's tale is, in the main, a familiar one;
earlier discussions concerning the past century of our legal history
have noted these shifting ideological tides. 28 White does make a
genuine contribution, however, by focusing on the impact of each
movement on tort doctrine. For example, he describes how the
doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk was derived from contract law by the Langdellian scientists, 29 how the Realists attempted to lessen the jury's role by restructuring the notion of
proximate cause, 30 and how Prosser used his "state of the law"
summary method to
advance the torts of privacy and infliction of
3
emotional distress. 1
Nevertheless, White's account of the development of torts is
much too one-sided. It overly relies on the autonomous nature of
law and denies, or at least too easily ignores, the materialist bases
that might underlay the ideas of the academics. Economic and societal events certainly helped mold the law of torts, albeit within
32
the constraints imposed by professional tradition and doctrine.

26. Id. at 219-30.
27. Id. at 233.
28. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977) (hereinafter cited as
GILMORE]; W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND
JUDICIAL PI'OCESS (1968) [hereinafter cited as RUMBLE].
29. TORT LAW IN AMERICA at 41-45.
30. Id. at 96-102.
31. Id. at 161, 173-76.
32. See Tushnet, Perspectives on the Development of American Law: A CriticalReview
of Friedman's "A History of American Law," 1977 WiS. L. REV. 81, 89 [hereinafter
cited as Tushnet].
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In a thoughtful review of White's earlier book, Patterns of
American Legal Thought, Jay M. Feinman states:
White emphasizes two moving forces of legal history:
institutional and doctrinal beliefs of the legal system, and
larger cultural attitudes and movements in social
thought. Institutional norms constrain the judge's
authority, for example, by requiring judges to follow approved techniques such as formally rational decisionmaking and adherence to precedent. Judges filter these
role constraints through their own social and political inclinations, which by and large reflect the social values
generated by dominant intellectual patterns. Thus
judicial law results from the interaction between ideas
embodied in the legal system and ideas embodied in the
culture."3
In contrast to this theory, Feinman posits that, in reality, there is
a constant interaction between legal thought and social forces and
that "the dominance of particular ideas is explained by their ser34
vice to the social relations of domination and subordination.' '
Although Feinman correctly notes that White unduly overemphasizes the autonomous role of ideas, his contrasting theory of
materialism does not necessarily better explain the nature of development in legal thought. Whereas Feinman states that "[i]f law
is interrelated with social practice, then perhaps social practice is
prior to law and not vice versa, 35 social practice may at times precede but may at other times follow law. In short, reality may be
too complex to be dominated
by either White's idealism or Fein36
man's materialism.
Two examples derived from Tort Law in America adequately
demonstrate this point. At the outset of his book, White describes
how the rise of the Langdellianist method of science mirrored the
decline of the utility of the writ system as a mode of doctrinal ordering. Although White clearly rejects the notion that the writ
system collapsed solely due to increasing obscurantism or to the
developing code movement, he does base the system's collapse on
the occurrence of an expanding economy that created a need for a
more complex writ system. 37 This appears to be a plausible explanation for the system's demise; the "stranger" cases, as White

33. Feinman, The Role of Ideas in Legal History, 78 MICH. L. REV. 722, 730 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Feinman].
34. Id. at 733.
35. Id at 729.
36. For a similar point of view concerning the complexities of establishing a doctrine's
genealogy, see Gordon, Review of Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History, 94
HARV. L. REV. 903, 907 (1981).
37. TORT LAW IN AMERICA at 8-12; Feinman, supra note 33, at 731.
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notes, did force courts to shift their doctrinal focus from an examination of the relationship between the parties to an examination of
what duty was owed by each party to the world at large.3
Yet, the recognition of this shift in emphasis does not explain
why the resultant tort law coalesced around the principle of negligence. If the scientific method was essentially a neutral method of
gathering and ordering knowledge, why, then, did the doctrine of
negligence appear to favor consistently the bourgeois entrepreneur or, at the least, a laissez-faire economy? To paraphrase Morton Horwitz's theory concerning the rise of legal formalism in the
middle of the nineteenth century, could the rise of Langdellianism
and its major doctrinal tool, negligence, be the result of the growing importance of an autonomous professional elite (the professoriat), a convergence of interest (even if not fully recognized by both
parties) between this new legal elite and the commercial and entrepreneurial interests, and the ability of the commercial interests to
have the law, even if now transformed, continue to serve their in39
terests?
White does recognize that, at the end of the nineteenth century, the theory of negligence was used to restrict, rather than to
expand, the potentially compensatory function of tort law. 40 Even
so, he appears to recoil from the full implications of his discussion
of, for example, the rise of the doctrine of assumption of risk from
a status-based contract context to a negligence context, in which
an employee was deemed fully "competent" to agree to undertake
dangerous employment at his own risk. 41 Although he correctly
recognizes that the collapse of the writ system was primarily
caused by outside economic conditions, White apparently does
not perceive that the same underlying economic and social factors
may have greatly affected the coalescence of tort law around the
theory of negligence.
In contrast to this example, which supports Feinman's
materialist view, there is the rise of strict liability in the era of
Consensus Legal Thought. As described by White, Prosser, in the
1941 edition of his treatise, noted an impetus by some courts to
find manufacturers strictly liable to third-party consumers who

38. TORT LAW IN AMERICA at 16.

39. M.

HORWiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,

1780-1860, at 255-56 (1977).

It is also interesting to note that the rise of mid-nineteenth century formalism was, as
with Langdellianism, preceded by declamations concerning the need to make law
more scientific. See P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 156-85 (1965).

40.

TORT LAW IN AMERICA at 61.

41. Id at 41-45. See generally Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in
the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property, ContracA and Tort 93
HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1980).
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incurred injuries from defective products. Prosser's delineation of
ample justifications for extending such liability did not hasten the
increased acceptance of the theory4 2 Nevertheless, after writing a
series of hortatory articles and drafting section 402A of the revised Restatement of Torts, Prosser managed to convince the
legal community of the need to replace an inefficient negligence
theory with a more realistic concept. As White correctly notes, the
rise of strict liability in this area catalyzed change in the compensatory function of tort law and, in part, effected an expanded concept of liability insurance. The processes of legal autonomy thus
helped to precipitate economic and social change.41
As Feinman notes, idealism views law as a rational activity
and promises reform through the exercise of reason; materialism
views law as the arena of ongoing class conflict concerning truth
and justice.44 White's argument, without taking into account economic and societal factors outside of the law, cannot reflect fully
4
the doctrinal development of torts in the last century.
If the lack of any serious materialist perspective was the only
problem with Tort Law in America, one could still praise it for presenting the reader with an important synthesis of ideas. Unfortunately, however, the book has other problems. For example, in
his discussion of Legal Realism, White strenuously attempts to
make a virtue of chronological and doctrinal order and thereby
contradicts himself, thus diminishing the effectiveness of his
argument. Although it is quite difficult to separate chronologically Social Jurisprudence from Legal Realism - especially when
one recognizes, as White correctly does, that both schools of
thought arose in response to Langdellianism - it is also impossible to state, as does White, that both schools were part of the
same movement and that they shared certain basic views. Contrary to White's assertion, 4 both schools of jurisprudence did not
endorse moral relativism. The Social Jurisprudes, such as Pound,
were "social engineers" who strove to improve society through
the use of social science methods. Unlike the "pure" Realists, they
were not distrustful of the efficacy of legal rules; rather, they
wanted such rules to be used to promote social progress. 47 This
distinction between the two schools of thought may be easily discerned by examining some of the writings directed by the Realists

42. TORT LAW IN AMERICA at 168.

43. Id. at 169-72.
44. Feinman, supra note 33, at 733-34.
45. When such factors are properly taken into account, then one is also able to better
note the facilitative, repressive, and ideological functions of the law. See Tushnet,
supra note 32, at 95-102.
46. TORT LAW IN AMERICA at 65-69.
47. Id at 70-71.
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at Pound. 48 Furthermore, to the extent that the Realists were in
fact moral relativists, perhaps White should not have used
Cardozo as his Realist exemplar. As White delineates quite
clearly, Cardozo was adept at using tort law both to protect and
promote his interpretation of the community's moral standards. 49
White's discussion of the development of Consensus Legal
Thought may well be disappointing to readers of his other works
because much of the discussion is derived from his already-published portrait of Judge Traynor50 This disappointment is compounded by the fact that White's earlier chapter on Traynor permits the reader to understand better Traynor's decision-making
process, because it also discusses Traynor's decisions in other
areas of the law. For example, in Tort Law in America, White
emphasizes Traynor's belief in judicial decision making as a

rational process, 51 whereas in The American Judicial Tradition

White states that, for Traynor, "judging was ultimately an art,
resisting precise characterization." 2 Also, given White's emphasis in Tort Law in America on the development of torts by
academics and judges, it is refreshing to read in The American
JudicialTradition-about "Traynor's partnership theory of legislative-court interaction." 53 Finally, one must even question why
White included Traynor as a singularly important precursor of a
now commonly accepted policy-making role for judges in tort
cases. Although Cardozo's method of policy making might have
been quite different than Traynor's, Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 4 represents an instance of judicial

policy making as important as, for example, Traynor's opinion in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.5 5

White is probably correct in stating that the overarching
theories constructed by the Neoconceptualists are not likely to
dominate tort law and to displace the complex of diverse wrongs
that presently contains both admonitory and compensatory elements.16 Yet, White fails to discuss why these "philosophically
48. See, e.g., Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean Pound 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). See also GILMORE, supra note 28, at 78 n.25; RUMBLE,
supra note 28, at 9-20.
49. TORT LAW IN AMERICA at 130-36.
50. THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 5, ch. 13.
51. TORT LAW IN AMERICA at 208-09.
52. THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 5, at 301.
53. Id. at 304.
54. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
55. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). Indeed, as a reviewer of Tort Law in America has
noted, if Traynor's principal achievement was to give legitimacy to "public
solutions" of torts issues, "one might well have thought that this orientation was so
radical a departure from the traditional way of viewing tort liability merely as an
issue between specific individuals that it would deserve to be elevated to a separate
chapter in the intellectual history of the subject." Fleming, Review of White, Tort
Law in America: An Intellectual History, 1980 A.B.A. FOUNDATION J. 614, 615.
56. TORT LAW IN AMERICA at 233.
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continuous series ' 57 are so popular. Are they the academic
response to the somewhat self-contained legislative solutions,
such as no-fault insurance, to selected problem areas in torts? Are
they attempts to demonstrate that courts can also administer,
with minimal balancing of interests, compensatory tort systems?
Although White states that our tort law is primarily the product of interaction between law professors and judges, he never
fully explains how the ideas of the professoriat are incorporated
by the judges into law. White also does not explain how, in the
United States, a country with fifty-one independent jurisdictions,
there is surprising uniformity of our tort law."'
In conclusion, it should be noted that Tort Law in America,
although myopic in scope, provides a valuable introduction to the
major intellectual changes and developments that have occurred
in tort law since the late nineteenth century. One hopes that in his
future work White will expand the scope of his vision to produce
the cultural-legal history of tort law that remains much needed.

57. O.W.

HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW

(M. Howe ed. 1963).

58. In a seminal article, Martin Shapiro theorized that this situation might be best
studied by using concepts derived from organization theory. Shapiro, Decentralized
Decision-Making in the Law of Torts, in POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING 44 (S. Ulmer
ed. 1970). Shapiro posited that "a communications system that generates a very
large volume of very small, but overwhelmingly supportive, messages may serve
under certain conditions as a substitute for formal, authoritative mechanisms to
achieve policy unity among multiple, independent, policymakers." Id at 53. The
study of this communications system might bring into focus some of the elements of
the lawmaking process that White ignores. For example, in addition to studying the
roles of the academic lawyers and judges, one might examine the roles played by the
attorneys who have the first opportunity to shape and to mold the facts for the
judges. Id at 53-55. Also, one might examine why certain doctrinal areas of tort law
change not at all for a lengthy period of time; why some change incrementally; why
some exhibit a tension and restraint pattern, in which tension builds until a sudden
catalyst releases the tension and permits a rather swift doctrinal reorientation; or
why some exhibit a mixture of these developmental patterns. Id at 60-72.

